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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to determine whether or not nominal exchange rate regimes affect 
the volatility of bilateral and effective real exchange rates. To that end, we examine the 
real exchange rate behaviour for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries during the 
1960-2006 period, therefore covering both the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates and adoption of generalised floating exchange rates from 1973. We make use of an 
econometric methodology based on the Hansen (1997)’s approximation to the p-values 
of the supreme, exponential and average statistics developed by Andrews (1993) and 
Andrews and Ploberger (1994). This methodology allows us to obtain a profile of p-
values and to delimit periods of stability and instability in the variance of real exchange 
rates. Results suggest that there is clear evidence in favour of the non-neutrality of 
nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange rate volatility for developed 
countries, but not in the case of developing or emerging countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
An important empirical question in international finance concerns the stability of 
real exchange rate (RER) volatility. Particularly, it is of interest to investigate the 
behaviour of the RER volatility under different nominal exchange rates arrangements. 
There is a strong theoretical1 and empirical academic debate on this issue, being the 
previous evidence mixed. On the one hand, Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), 
Flood and Rose (1995), Rogers (1995), Liang (1998) and Carrera and Vuletin (2003), 
among others, find a positive relation between RERs volatility and the degree of 
flexibility of the nominal exchange rate regime. However, on the other hand, Grilly and 
Kaminsky (1991) find that the distribution of the monthly rate of change of the RER is 
the same under fixed and floating regimes for the pre-World War II data, but different 
for the post-World War II data. Thus, they conclude that the RER behaviour depends on 
the particular historical period, rather than upon the nominal exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, Kent and Naja (1998) examine the relationship between the short-term 
volatility of the real effective exchange rate (REER) and the degree of the flexibility of 
the nominal exchange rate. Based on pooled results across a set of countries, they find 
that the REER is only twice volatile under floating regimes than under fixed regimes. 
Results within countries show that for most countries there is no significant increase in 
volatility when moving to more flexible exchange rate regimes and, indeed, there are 
even some countries in which volatility is lower under more flexibility exchange rate 
regimes. Thus, from previous literature we would like to remark that there is not a clear 
consensus on the connection between exchange rate regimes and RER volatility. This 
                                                          
1 For a further discussion on theoretical advances on this issue see Carrera and Vuletin (2003) and 
Bastourre and Carrera (2004). 
issue is of relevance because the RER volatility looks to have important effects on 
macroeconomics variables (Frankel and Rose, 1995). 
This paper tries to shed some light on the RER behaviour using an alternative 
data set and a new econometric methodology than the one used in the previous 
literature. For this end, two samples of twenty-two OECD and twenty non-OECD 
countries for the 1960-2006 period are considered, therefore covering both the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and adoption of generalised floating exchange 
rates from 1973. The two groups of countries have marked differences on 
macroeconomic stability, constituting an interesting scenario for comparison. 
The approach taken here marks a departure from traditional literature on the 
non-neutrality of nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange rate volatility. 
Specifically, we sequentially apply tests for a structural change in variance to a range of 
possible breakpoints, therefore avoiding us to assume a prior knowledge of its location. 
Our strategy to monitoring a structural change in variance is based on the Hansen 
(1997)’s approximation to the p-values of the supreme, exponential and average 
statistics developed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). We will 
apply this methodology following the approach proposed by McConnell and Pérez-
Quirós (2000) and Camacho (2004). This approach allows us to obtain a profile of p-
values and to delimit periods of stability and instability in the variance of not only the 
bilateral RERs but in the variance of the REERs too. 
For most OECD countries in our sample, our results identify a first period of 
stability in the variance of the RER until early/mid 1970s, following by a period 
characterised by strong evidence of instability in the variance. Therefore, the results 
seem to suggest that changes in the RER volatility would have been linked to a specific 
nominal exchange rate regime, giving support to the non-neutrality hypothesis of 
nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange rate volatility. In contrast, there 
is not a clear pattern RER volatility and exchange rate regime for the non-OECD 
countries, suggesting that macroeconomic performance and financial developments 
could play a significant role in the relationship between those two variables. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric 
methodology used for testing structural breaks in the RER volatility. Section 3 describes 
the data set. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology: Testing for Structural Breaks in Volatility 
 
Our analysis to detect structural breaks in volatility is based on univariate 
autoregressive models for first differences (growth rates) of the real exchange rate 
series, which we denote as qt. Following McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) and 
Camacho (2004), we compute, at any quarter (month) t, the GMM estimates of the 
specification 
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 and s refers to data of the period from 1960 to s, the instruments for each period s are a 
constant, qt, D1s and D2s, T is the estimated break point and 1  and 2  are the 
estimators of the standard deviation.2 
 Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) develop statistics for cases 
similar to the previous one, where the parameter T appears under the alternative 
hypothesis but not under the null of constant conditional standard deviation ( 1 = 2 ). 
They define the function Fn(T) as the Wald (W), Likelihood Ratio (LR) or Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) statistic of the hypothesis that 1 = 2 , for break date T, where n is the 
number of observations. We assume that T lies in a range T1, T2.
 3 Specifically, Andrews 
(1993) considers the supreme statistic: 
 
where F=W, LR or LM.  
On the other hand, Andrews and Ploberger (1994) consider the exponential and 
average statistics, given by the following expressions: 
                                                          
2 If t  follows a normal distribution, t

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2
 is an unbiased estimator of the standard deviation of t  
(see McConnell  and Pérez-Quirós, 2000, and Camacho, 2004). 
3 We set T1=.15n and T2=.85n (see Andrews, 1993 and Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). 
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 where F=W, LR or LM.  
 The asymptotic distributions of these statistics are non-standard and have been 
obtained by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994), together with their 
asymptotic critical values. In this paper we apply these statistics, using the associated p-
values obtained following the approximation developed by Hansen (1997). In particular, 
we will perform an out of sample test, compute the p-values associated with the 
supreme, exponential and average statistics for any quarter, and obtain a profile of p-
values to be plotted. In doing so, we will have numerical and graphical information that 
will be used to delimit periods of stability and instability of the R(E)ER volatility.  
 
3. Data 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use monthly/quarterly data4 of the consumer price 
index and the end of period bilateral nominal exchange rates against the United States 
Dollar (USD) to construct the bilateral real exchange rates for our set of OECD and 
non-OECD countries, covering the 1960-2006 period.5 Moreover, from previous data, 
we construct real effective exchange rates for each country, covering the 1960-2006 
period, as a trade-weighted average of bilateral RERs with those trading partners 
encompassing 4 per cent or more of trade in either exports or imports.6 The trade 
weights are fixed and have been taken from Goldfajn and Valdés (1999). The OECD 
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
                                                          
4 The data frequency depends on availability. See Appendix. 
5 The selected countries under study depends on data availability. With the beginning of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the currencies of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain disappeared, being replaced by the Euro. 
Therefore, the sample period for these countries only covers the 1960-1998 period. 
6 This way of constructing REERs is the usual practise followed by the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Central Bank and the Deutsche Bundesbank, among others institutions. 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The non-OECD 
countries are Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Egypt, Haiti, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Malta, Morocco, 
Philippines, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.7  
The data used in this paper came from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
of the International Monetary Fund and the OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
 
[Insert Figures 1(a) and 1(b) here] 
 
Figures 1(a) and 1 (b) plot the first log differences of the monthly/quarterly 
RERs against the United States Dollar during the period 1960-2006 and Figures 2(a) 
and 2(b) plot the first log differences of the monthly/quarterly REERs during the period 
1960-2006. A simple look at Figures 1(a) and 2(a) for the OECD countries show the 
differences in the RER volatility during and after the Bretton Woods periods. In 
particular, during the Bretton Woods fixed exchange period (1960 to 1973), the RER 
volatility is much smaller than in the post-Bretton Woods, flexible exchange rate period. 
However, this behaviour does not graphically emerge in the set of real exchange rates 
for the non-OECD group of countries. 
[Insert Figures 2(a) and 2(b) here] 
 
 
                                                          
7 We do not construct the effective real exchange rate for the OECD countries Austria and Luxembourg 
and the non-OECD countries Chile, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Egypt, India and Malta 
due to the lack of trade weights data for those countries.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. A First Interpretation of Results 
Empirical results on changes in the real exchange rate volatility are shown in 
Tables 1 to 4 and in Figures 3 and 4.  
[Insert Tables 1 to 4 here] 
 
Tables 1 (3) and 2 (4) report the periods of stability/instability detected for the 
variance of real (effective) exchange rates for our sets of OECD and non-OECD 
countries, respectively. First and second columns indicate the country and the sample 
period,8 columns three to five offer a summary of results regarding the p-values. In 
particular, they indicate whether the p-values from the supreme (pvsup), the exponential 
(pvexp) and the average (pvave) statistics are up or below the standard 0.05 critical 
value. In several cases, we indicate whether the p-values are in the interval [0.05, 0.10]. 
The sixth column indicates if there is or not evidence in favour of instability in the 
variance of real exchange rates during the sub-period indicated in column two. In 
general, we conclude that there is evidence of instability in the variance of the series 
when at least two out of the three statistics are below the 0.05 critical value. In addition, 
we conclude that there is marginal evidence of instability when the p-values are in the 
interval [0.05, 0.10]. Figures 3 and 4 show the results regarding the p-values 
graphically. 
[Insert Figures 3(a) and 3(b) here] 
[Insert Figures 4(a) and 4(b) here] 
 
Table 1 and Figure 3(a) report the results regarding bilateral RERs for the OECD 
countries. We can identify two potential groups of countries with different RER 
volatility characteristics. A first group of countries show successive sub-periods of RER 
stability and RER instability, being the break point located around 1973. This group is 
formed by Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.9 
Canada and Spain could also be included in this group, although the break point occurs 
latter (1979 and 1981, respectively). In the case of Spain, this break point coincides with 
the introduction of a de facto crawling around the Deutschmark [see Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2007)]. On the other hand, there is a 
second group of countries, with an initial period of stability, followed by a period of 
instability, then a period of renewed stability and, finally, a further period of instability. 
In those countries, in addition to the break point around 1973, a first period of instability 
is found between the end of 1960s and 1971.10 This group includes Austria, Finland, 
The Netherlands and New Zealand.11 Korea presents also this pattern, although the 
second break point is located in 1967 instead of 1973, where a period of quasi-flexible 
regime started with the US dollar (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  
As for the non-OECD countries, Table 2 and Figure 3(b) show the results for the 
bilateral RERs. In this case, RER volatility characteristics could be summarised in five 
potential groups of countries. Once again, we can identify a first group of countries, 
with successive sub-periods of RER stability and RER instability, being the break point 
located around 1973. This group includes Burkina Faso, Sri Lanka, Malta and South 
Africa. A second group of countries is formed by Cyprus, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 The sample starts at 1963 instead of 1960 because we compute the p-values starting from a sample of 
twelve observations. 
9 The detected instability around 1963 in Australia and Norway disappear when we repeat the analysis 
with more initial observations (i.e., for the period 1957.I-2003.IV and 1957.01-2003.12, respectively). 
Thus, this apparent instability at the beginning of the sample would just indicate the insufficient power of 
the statistics when applied to a small initial sample. Nevertheless, this instability could be related to the 
reserve problems experienced by the United Kingdom. 
10 The detected instability around 1964 in Finland disappear when we repeat the analysis with more initial 
observations (i.e., for the period 1957.I-1998.IV). 
11 Note that in 1967, the New Zealand dollar substituted the New Zealand pound, being the new currency 
pegged to the Pound sterling (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
Morocco, where we detect also a single transition from stability to instability, although 
the break point occurs in 1981, 1963, 1990, 1984 and 1979, respectively. There is a 
third group with an initial period of stability, followed by a period of instability, then a 
period of renewed stability and, finally, a further period of instability. This group 
includes Honduras and Jamaica, being the break points located in 1965 and 1988, and in 
1978 and 1984, respectively. A fourth group of countries emerges, were there is a 
succession of recursive periods of stability and instability. This group includes 
Colombia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
Finally, the results for India indicate that there has been stability through all the sample 
and those for Israel suggest that after an instability period covering the 1963-1971 
period, a stability period opens from 1971. Therefore, there is not a clear relationship 
between precise changes in the nominal exchange rate regimes and the detected break 
points for almost all non-OECD countries, leaving open the possibility that there may 
have been some other event unrelated to the nominal exchange rate regime (real shocks, 
shifts in international demand, monetary policy instability, discovery of new natural 
resources, etc.) contributing to the change in RER volatility.  
Regarding the REER volatility, the results for the OECD countries are depicted 
in Table 3 and Figure 4(a), while those for the non-OECD countries are presented in 
Table 4 and Figure 4(b). In general, results are similar to the previous ones using 
bilateral RERs, except for the cases of Australia, Colombia, Ivory Coast and Norway 
(where now there is only a break point), Burkina Faso, Greece and Phillipines (where 
now there are two break points) and Spain (where a new stability period opens after EU 
accession in 1986). Therefore, all in all, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
instability obtained is robust to the real exchange rate used. 
As for the interpretation of the detected periods of instability, in the first place, 
the 1973 breaking point could be associated with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system and the advent of floating exchange rates (see, i.e., Cooper, 1999). This break 
point appears in all countries using the bilateral or effective RERs. 
Secondly, the instability period detected between the end of 1960s and 1971 
could be clearly associated with the third realignment experimented by the Bretton 
Woods system at the end of 1960s and the general Smithsonian realignment at the end 
of 1971. It is interesting to note that during 1967 the Switch pound was abolished after 
being operating from 1950, leading to devaluation and a monetary turmoil. On the other 
hand, after the United States suspended convertibility of the Dollar into gold in August 
1971, an effort was made, in the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, to re-
establish a stable per value structure of exchange rates. A multilateral realignment of 
exchange rates was negotiated to eliminate the overvaluation of the Dollar that had 
developed during the Bretton Woods par values regime, by devaluing the Dollar and 
appreciating the central rates of the currencies of the other major industrial countries. 
Not many months after the Smithsonian Agreement, exchange markets again became 
volatile and disorderly. 
Finally, as a further attempt to link the timing of changes in the volatility of RER 
to the timing of changes in the nominal exchange rate regime, we have tried to 
document whether or not the instability episodes have been associated with flexible 
exchange rate regimes. To that end, we have made used of the coarse grid classification 
of exchange-rate regimes provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for our selection of 
countries and sample periods. In particular, we have considered five broad regime 
categories: fixed, quasi-fixed, quasi-flexible, freely floating and freely falling.12 
                                                          
12 In Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)  there is a sixth category named “dual market in which parallel market 
data is missing”, but there are no observations under such regime for the countries and sample period 
Since our results for instability are detected using data are vis-à-vis the USD and 
some of the countries under study have taken other currencies as references for pegs, in 
the last column of Tables 1 and 2 we report only the regime against the USD in order to 
facilitate the interpretation. Therefore if, for example, the Belgian franc is classified by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) during the1974.2-1975.6 period as a de facto peg to 
Deutsche Mark and the latter is freely floating against the USD, we conclude that the 
Belgian franc was freely floating vis-à-vis the USD. The same procedure is used for the 
REERs taking into account the main trading partners in order to determine the exchange 
rate regime against the USD. 
For the OECD sample, results in Table 1 indicate that in 29 out of the 38 cases 
stability episodes were associated with fixed exchange rates, being 5 of the remainder 
subperiods linked to quasi-fixed exchange rates and the other 4 to quasi-flexible 
regimes. As for the instability episodes, in 35 out of 72 cases they were associated with 
freely floating, in 21 cases with quasi-flexible regimes, in 7 cases with quasi-fixed 
regimes and in 9 cases with fixed exchange rates. 
Regarding the non-OECD countries (Table 2)13, in 19 out of the 57 cases for 
which we have information, stability episodes were associated with fixed exchange 
rates, 31 cases with quasi-fixed exchange rates and the 7 remainder cases with to quasi-
flexible regimes. For the instability episodes, in 7 out of 62 cases they were associated 
with freely falling, in 12 cases with freely floating, in 18 cases with quasi-flexible 
regimes, in 17 cases with quasi-fixed regimes and in 8 remainder cases with fixed 
exchange rates. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
examined. Data are available at Carmen Reinhart's web page: 
http://www.wam.umd.edu/~creinhar/Links.html 
13 Given that Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) do not offer information on the evolution of exchange rate 
regimes in Ivory Coast and Trinidad y Tobago, we cannot analyse these countries. 
As for the REER results, Table 3 shows a strong association between instability 
episodes and freely floating (35 out of 53 cases) and between tranquil sub-periods and 
fixed exchange rates (22 out of 37 cases) for the OCED countries, while Table 4 
suggests that, for the non-OECD countries under study, although there is evidence of a 
clear connection between tranquil sub-periods and fixed exchange rates (15 out of 27 
cases), the relationship between instability episodes and freely floating is much weaker 
(9 out of 26 cases). 
All in all, this empirical evidence seems to suggest that tranquil periods were 
associated with fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates for both groups of countries, while 
instability episodes were more likely to be found under freely floating or quasi-flexible 
regimes in the OCDE sample but not necessarily for the non-OECD countries under 
study. 
4.2. An Alternative Interpretation of Results: A Further Analysis 
An alternative interpretation of the detected volatility changes is that it could be  
generated not so much by a flexible nominal rate regime, but rather by the fact that a 
fixed exchange rate regime was maintained for “too long”, requiring a very large 
adjustment of the real exchange rate (via a change in the nominal exchange rate)14. 
From this point of view, much of volatility in a more flexible exchange rate regime 
might be driven by an initial realignment of the RER in response to misalignment under 
the earlier more fixed exchange rate regime. This is not to say that all fixed exchange 
rate regimes lead to misalignment and the more so the longer it has been in place. 
Instead, this is an argument about the level of the RER being far from fundamental 
levels, and that this forces a move to a flexible nominal exchange rate regime, with an 
initial period during which the nominal and real exchange rate are extremely volatile.  
                                                          
14 We are very grateful to a referee for pointing out this point. 
In order to empirically explore this possibility, we perform two complementary 
analyses. In first place, we try to confirm that volatility in sub-periods with evidence of 
instability is higher than in more tranquil episodes. In second place, we estimate 
GARCH models incorporating regimen duration in the variance equation.  
[Insert Tables 5(a) to 5(d) here] 
 
Regarding to the first analysis, Tables from 5(a) to 5(d) report the results of 
excluding initial periods once a jump up in volatility is detected for OECD and non-
OECD countries. As can be seen, for OECD countries in almost all cases (19 out of the 
22 possible cases)15 results suggest that those sub-periods where we have found 
evidence in favour of instability do show higher volatility than more stable sub-periods. 
For non-OECD countries the evidence is mixed: there are 8 out of the 17 possible cases 
in which instable sub-periods exhibit higher volatility than in more tranquil sub-periods, 
7 out of the 17 possible cases in which this results is confirmed for several sub-periods 
for the same country, and just 2 out of the 17 possible cases in which this result is not 
supported by the data. Similar evidence are found using REER data. 
Regarding the second analysis, we have estimated GARCH(1,1) models 
incorporating regimen duration in the variance equation:16 
2 2 2
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where 
1log( / )t t tr q q   and td  denotes regime duration, computed as number of periods 
(quarters or months) that a given exchange-rate regime has been in operation at time t. 
                                                          
15 Note that in the other 3 out of the 22 possible cases (Austria, Netherlands and New Zealand), this result 
is confirmed in one of the sub-periods. 
16 We also examined other ARCH(p) and GARCH(p,q) specifications, but the GARCH(1,1) model was 
preferred both in terms of both the log likelihood and the AIC and SIC model selection criteria (see Sin 
and White, 1996). 
To compute 
td  we have used abovementioned Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid 
classification. 
[Insert Table 5(e) here] 
 
Table 5(e) reports the estimated coefficients for 
td ( ˆ ) and the probability 
numbers (p-values) of the associated z-statistics. Note that we have excluded in our 
analysis Ivory Coast and Trinidad y Tobago since Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) do not 
offer information on the evolution of exchange rate regimes for these countries. As can 
be seen, for the RER in the OECD countries duration has a positive effect on volatility 
in 18 out of the 22 cases analysed (being significant in 12 cases), while only in the 4 
remain cases we find a negative effect (but only significant for The Netherlands). In 
contrast, for the RER in the non-OECD countries we obtain a negative effect on 
volatility in 14 out of the 18 cases considered (being significant in 12 cases) and only in 
the 4 remain cases a positive impact is detected (being only significant for Dominican 
Republic, Egypt and Jamaica). A similar pattern arises for the REER data. Therefore, 
our findings suggest that while for the OECD countries longer regime durations are 
associated with increasingly R(E)ER volatility levels, for non-OECD countries the 
opposite seems to be true.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we have attempted to contribute to the wide and active research 
programme on the behaviour of real exchange rate (RER) volatility under different 
nominal exchange rate regimes. This is an important question given the strong effect of 
RER volatility on several macroeconomic variables such as consumption, investment 
and trade flows (Frankel and Rose, 1995) or even on the long-term growth path (Rodrik, 
2000). In particular, we have examined the changes in the bilateral and effective RER 
volatility registered in twenty OECD industrial countries and twenty non-OECD 
developing countries, during the 1960-2006 period, therefore covering both the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and adoption of generalised floating exchange 
rates from 1973. To that end, we departure from previous research in this area by using 
an econometric methodology based on the Hansen (1997)’s approximation to the p-
values of the supreme, exponential and average statistics developed by Andrews (1993) 
and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). This methodology allows us to obtain a profile of p-
values and to delimit periods of stability and instability in the variance of real exchange 
rates. 
The main results are as follows. First, we found a group of seventeen out of the 
twenty two OECD industrial countries examined where the profile of the p-values 
exhibits a first period of stability in the RER volatility followed by a second period of 
instability. In addition, there is a second group formed by the remainder five countries 
which present a very similar profile of p-values: a first period of stability, a second 
period of instability, a third period of stability and a fourth period of instability in the 
variance of the RER. Regarding the break point from stability to instability is located 
(mostly) around 1973 for the first group of countries, when the practice of fixing 
exchange was generally abandoned by the major countries. This break point also 
appears in the change of RER volatility in the second group of countries between the 
third period of stability to the fourth period of instability. Our results suggest that these 
countries would have also experienced a previous RER instability period between the 
end of 1960s and 1971 associated with the third and the general Smithsonian 
realignments, respectively. 
Second, in this case of the non-OECD developing countries, a clear pattern does 
not emerge: in nine out of the twenty cases considered we find a single transition from 
RER stability to RER instability; in other two cases, we detect an initial period of 
stability, followed by a period of instability, then a period of renewed stability and, 
finally, a further period of instability; in other six cases we observe a succession of 
recursive periods of stability and instability; in one case we obtain evidence of stability 
through all the sample and in the remain case we find a transition from instability to 
stability. As for the break points, only in four out of the twenty cases examined we 
identify the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 as a potential explanation 
of the change in the RER volatility. For the rest of developing countries, there is not a 
clear relationship between precise changes in the nominal exchange rate regimes and the 
detected break points, thus leaving open the possibility that there may have been some 
other event unrelated to the nominal exchange rate regime contributing to the change in 
RER volatility.  
Third, the evidence of instability obtained for the bilateral and effective real 
exchange rates is very similar, therefore suggesting that our results are robust to the real 
exchange rate used.  
For the OECD countries, we could interpret our result as evidence in favour of 
the non-neutrality hypothesis of nominal exchange rate regime regarding real exchange 
rate volatility, since the period of stability is detected until early/mid 1970s and was 
followed by a new period exhibiting strong evidence of instability in RER variance.
 This in turn could suggest that the change in the RER volatility would have be 
linked to a specific nominal exchange rate: the transition from a fixed nominal exchange 
rate regime to a flexible nominal exchange rate regime after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. Moreover, the instability detected by the end of 1960 and 1971 in six 
out of twenty countries can be associated with realignments in the Bretton Woods 
system. Thus, we could conclude that for our set of OECD industrial countries the 
evidence suggests a parallel movement of nominal and real exchange rates. In contrast, 
there is not a clear pattern RER volatility and exchange rate regime for the non-OECD 
countries, suggesting that macroeconomic performance and financial developments 
could play a significant role in the relationship between those two variables. 
Our results also show a notorious difference in terms of RER volatility 
according to the degree of development of the country. This finding is in line with 
recent discussion on dynamics of exchange rate regimes, where it is argued that the 
more financially developed part of the world has been able to exploit to its fullest 
possible extent its ability to float, while the less financial developed ones have always 
faced serious difficulties due to the “original sin” and “hollowing out” hypotheses (see, 
e. g., Hausman et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, while for OECD countries the empirical evidence presented in this 
paper seems to suggest that instability sub-periods show higher volatility than more 
stable sub-periods, for non-OECD countries the evidence is mixed. On the other hand, 
our results indicate that stability periods are associated with fixed or quasi-fixed 
exchange rates for both groups of countries, while instability episodes are more likely to 
be found under freely floating or quasi-flexible regimes in the OCDE sample but not 
necessarily for the non-OECD countries under study.  
Finally, our findings suggest that the relationship between RER volatility and 
regime duration could be quite different depending on the particular macroeconomic 
conditions experienced by both group of countries, since we obtain that for the OECD 
countries greater regime duration is associated with increasingly R(E)ER volatility 
levels, while for non-OECD countries the opposite seems to be true.  
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Appendix: Data frequency and period covered 
Country Frequency Period RER Period REER 
OECD  
Australia AUL Quarterly 1960.I-2003.IV 1960.I-2003.IV 
Austria AUT Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 - 
Belgium BEL Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Canada CAN Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Denmark DEN Quarterly 1960.I-2003.IV 1960.I-2003.IV 
Finland FIN Quarterly 1960.I-1998.IV 1960.I-1998.IV 
France FRA Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Germany GER Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Greece GRE Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Ireland IRE Quarterly 1960.I-1998.IV 1960.I-1998.IV 
Italy ITA Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Japan JAP Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Korea KOR Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Luxemburg LUX Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 - 
Netherlands NET Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Norway NOR Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
New Zealand NZL Quarterly 1960.I-2003.IV 1960.I-2003.IV 
Portugal POR Quarterly 1960.I-1998.IV 1960.I-1998.IV 
Spain SPA Monthly 1960.3-1998.12 1960.3-1998.12 
Sweden SWE Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Switzerland SWI Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
United Kingdom UKG Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Non-OECD  
Burkina Faso BFA Monthly 1960.3-2006.10 1960.3-2006.10 
Chile CHL Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 - 
Colombia COL Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Cyprus CYP Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 - 
Dominican Republic DRP Monthly 1960.3-2006.5 - 
El Salvador SLV Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 - 
Egypt EGY Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 - 
Haiti HTI Monthly 1960.3-2006.6 1960.3-2006.6 
Honduras HND Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
India IND Monthly 1960.3-2006.11 - 
Israel ISR Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Ivory Coast IVC Monthly 1960.3-2006.8 1960.3-2006.8 
Jamaica JAM Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Malta MAL Monthly 1960.3-2006.10 - 
Morocco MOR Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Philippines PHI Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
South Africa SOA Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Sri Lanka SRI Monthly 1960.3-2006.12 1960.3-2006.12 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO Monthly 1960.3-2006.10 1960.3-2006.10 
Venezuela VEN Monthly 1960.3-2006.11 1960.3-2006.11 
Notes:  
RER: real exchange rate 
REER: real effective exchange rate. 
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Table 1. Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
OECD RERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
AUSTRALIA 
1963.I- 2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1963.IV 
From 1964.I to 1973.III 
From 1973.IV to 1976.III 
From 1976.IV to 1982.IV 
From 1983.I to 2003.IV 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES                    
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
AUSTRIA 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.1 to 1968.6 
From 1968.7 to 1971.4 
From 1971.5 to 1974.11 
From 1974.12 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
BELGIUM 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.1 to 1973.3 
From 1973.4 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
CANADA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1978.8 
From 1978.9 to 1979.5 
From 1979.6 to 1982.4 
From 1982.5 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
DENMARK 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 1978.III 
From 1978.IV to 1979.IV 
From 1980.I to 2003.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FINLAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1963.IV 
From 1964.I to 1964.III 
From 1964.IV to 1967.III 
From 1967.IV to 1969.II 
From 1970.IV to 1974.III 
From 1974.IV to 1975.III 
From 1975.IV to 1979.IV 
From 1980.I to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FRANCE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
GERMANY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1975.9 
From 1975.10 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
GREECE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1972.6 
From 1972.7 to 1974.3 
From 1974.4 to 1977.9 
From 1977.10 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
IRELAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1973.III 
From 1973.IV to 1976.I 
From 1976.II to 1976.IV 
From 1977.I to 1979.IV 
From 1980.I to 1981.II 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES* 
YES 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
 From 1981.III to 1998.IV <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 YES FREELY FLOATING 
 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994); c. 
YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
 
Table 1 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
OECD RERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
ITALY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 1975.10 
From 1975.11 to 1978.10 
From 1978.11 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
JAPAN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1974.9 
From 1974.10 to 1978.2 
From 1978.3 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
KOREA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1964.4 
From 1964.5 to 1964.12 
From 1965.1 to 1966.4 
From 1965.5 to 1966.12 
From 1967.1 to 1968.6 
From 1968.7 to 1969.11 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
 From 1969.12 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 1974.11 
From 1974.12 to 1977.8 
From 1977.9 to 2005.8 
From 2005.9 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
LUXEMBURG 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1971.II 
From 1971.III to 1971.IV 
From 1972.I to 1973.I 
From 1973.II to 1974.II 
From 1974.III to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
NETHERLANDS 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1967.8 
From 1967.9 to 1967.10 
From 1967.11 to 1968.6 
From 1968.7 to 1968.12 
From 1969.1 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 1975.9 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
 From 1975.10 to 1998.12 <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 YES FREELY FLOATING 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.II 
From 1967.III to 1967.IV 
From 1968.I to 1968.IV 
From 1969.I to 1969.III 
From 1969.IV to 1972.I 
From 1972.II to 1972.IV 
From 1973.I to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 1976.I 
From 1976.II to 1983.IV 
From 1984.I to 2003.IV 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES* 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
NORWAY 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.4 
From 1963.5 to 1973.5 
From 1973.6 to 1976.12 
From 1977.1 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). c. 
YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
Table 1 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
OECD RERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
 
PORTUGAL 
1963.I-1998.IV 
 
From 1963.I to 1973.IV 
From 1974.I to 1976.IV 
From 1977.I to 1981.I 
From 1981.II to 1998.IV 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
SPAIN 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1981.3 
From 1981.4 to 1982.5 
From 1982.6 to 1987.7 
From 1987.7 to 1998.12 
 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
 
 
FIXED 
QUSI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
SWEDEN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1969.7 
From 1969.8 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
SWITZERLAND 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.4 
From 1972.5 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 2006.12 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
YES 
YES 
 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.8 
From 1972.9 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 2006.12 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.0S 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
  Notes 
a. RER: real exchange rate.  
b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). 
c. YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: 
no evidence 
of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
 
 
Table 2. Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
NON-OECD RERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
BURKINA FASO 
1963.3- 2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.3  
From 1973.4 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 1975.6 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.5 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
CHILE 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1975.7 to 2006.12 
From 1963.3 
From 1963.4 to 1978.4 
From 1978.5 to 1979.1 
From 1979.2 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FREELY FLOATING 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
COLOMBIA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.8 
From 1963.9 to 1964.3 
From 1964.4 to 1965.8 
From 1965.9 to 1967.3 
From 1967.4 to 1967.7 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
 
 
1967.8 
From 1967.9 to 1967.11 
From 1967.12 to 1968.8 
From 1968.9 to 1968.10 
From 1968.11 to 1970.8 
From 1970.9 to 1971.11 
1971.12 
From 1972.1 to 1972.6 
From 1972.7 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1973.9 
From 1973.10 to 1974.6 
From 1974.7 to 1974.9 
From 1974.10 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 1975.5 
From 1975.6 to 1975.11 
1975.12 
From 1976.1 to 1976.2 
From 1976.3 to 1976.5 
From 1976.6 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
CYPRUS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1981.4 
From 1981.5 to 1981.7 
From 1981.8 to 1983.10 
From 1983.11 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1976.6 
From 1976.7 to 1975.11 
From 1976.12 to 1977.10 
From 1977.11 to 1978.2 
From 1978.3 to 1978.8 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
 From 1978.9 to 1979.11 
From 1979.12 to 1981.12 
From 1982.1 to 1983.3 
From 1983.9 to 1984.12 
From 1985.1 to 1987.8 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
YES* 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FIXED 
 From 1987.9 to 1993.1 
From 1993.2 to 1993.8 
From 1993.9 to 1996.9 
From 1997.10 to 1999.3 
From 1999.4 to 2003.9 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
 From 2003.10 to 2006.5 >0.05 >0.05 >0.05 NO N/A 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). c. 
YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. N/A= no available 
Table 2 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
NON-OECD 
RERa 
Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
EL SALVADOR 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1990.4 
From 1990.5 to 1991.3 
From 1991.4 to 2000.4 
From 2000.5 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
EGYPT 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.3 to 1963.9 
From 1963.10 to 1963.12 
From 1964.1 to 1964.11 
From 1964.12 to 1982.3 
From 1982.4 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 1985.5 
From 1985.6 to 1989.7 
From 1989.8 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FIXED 
HAITI 
1963.3-2006.6 
From 1963.3 to 1984.3 
From 1984.4 to 1991.8 
From 1991.9 to 2006.6 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
HONDURAS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.10 
From 1963.11 to 1964.5 
From 1964.6 to 1965.8 
From 1965.9 to 1967.2 
From 1967.3 to 1988.3 
From 1988.4 to 1989.6 
From 1989.7 to 2006.7 
From 2006.8 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
N/A 
INDIA 
1963.3-2006.11 
From 1963.3 to 2006.2 
From 2006.3 to 2006.9 
From 2006.10 to 2006.11 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
NO 
NO 
QUASI-FIXED 
N/A 
N/A 
ISRAEL 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1965.12 
From 1966.1 to 1967.4 
From 1967.5 to 1971.3 
From 1971.4 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
IVORY COAST 
1963.3-2006.8 
From 1963.3 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 1983.4 
From 1983.5 to 1984.2 
From 1984.3 to 1984.11 
From 1984.12 to 1985.7 
From 1985.8 to 1987.5 
From 1987.6 to 1994.1 
From 1994.2 to 1996.7 
From 1996.8 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
JAMAICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 1970.11 
From 1970.12 to 1978.4 
From 1978.5 to 1980.11 
From 1980.12 to 1983.12 
From 1984.1 to 1985.2 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
 From 1985.3 to 2006.12 <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 YES FREELY FLOATING 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994); c. 
YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. N/A= no available 
 
Table 2 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
NON-OECD 
RERa 
Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
MALTA 
1963.3-2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 1981.1 
From 1981.2 to 2006.10 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
MOROCCO 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.5 
From 1974.6 to 1978.12 
From 1979.1 to 1981.6 
From 1981.7 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05] 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
PHILIPPINES 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1969.4 
From 1969.5 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 1979.8 
From 1979.9 to 1979.11 
From 1979.12 to 1983.9 
From 1983.10 to 1989.7 
From 1989.8 to 1990.3 
From 1990.4 to 1990.8 
From 1990.9 to 1990.10 
From 1990.11 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.1 
From 1973.2 to 1974.8 
From 1974.9 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
SRI LANKA 
1963.3-2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.7 
From 1973.8 to 1974.2 
From 1974.3 to 1989.8 
From 1989.9 to 2006.10 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES* 
YES* 
YES 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBE 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 1976.11 
From 1976.12 to 1980.12 
From 1981.1 to 1984.5 
From 1984.6 to 1990.12 
From 1991.1 to 1993.4 
From 1993.5 to 1995.7 
From 1995.8 to 1997.3 
From 1997.4 to 1999.6 
From 1999.7 to 2003.1 
From 2003.2 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
VENEZUELA 
1963.3-2006.11 
From 1963.3 to 1969.2 
From 1969.3 to 1970.3 
From 1970.4 to 1972.7 
1972.8  
From 1972.9 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 1978.6 
From 1978.7 to 1979.9 
From 1979.10 to 1985.9 
From 1985.10 to 1986.9 
From 1986.10 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994).c. 
YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. N/A= no available 
Table 3. Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
OECD REERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
AUSTRALIA 
1963.I- 2003:IV 
From 1963.I to 1973.II  
From 1973.III to 1978.IV 
From 1979.I to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
BELGIUM 
1963.3-1998.3 
From 1963.3 to 1973.2  
From 1973.3 to 1980.3 
From 1980.4 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
CANADA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1965.2  
From 1965.3 to 1966.2 
From 1966.3 to 1978.9 
From 1978.10 to 1981.7 
From 1981.8 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXISIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXISIBLE 
DENMARK 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1980.I 
From 1980.II to 1987.III 
From 1987.IV to 1989.II 
From 1989.III to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FINLAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.IV 
From 1968.I to 1968.III 
From 1968.IV to 1972.IV 
From 1973.I to 1985.I 
From 1985.II to 1988.III 
From 1988.IV to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FRANCE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.2  
From 1974.3 to 1976.4 
From 1976.5 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
GERMANY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.6  
From 1974.7 to 1976.8 
From 1976.9 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
GREECE 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1969.12 
From 1970.1 to 1988.5 
From 1988.6 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
IRELAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1973.II 
From 1973.III to 1973.IV 
From 1974.I to 1974.III 
From 1974.IV to 1978.IV 
From 1979.I to 1980.IV 
From 1981.I to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
ITALY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.2  
From 1974.3 to 1974.9 
From 1974.10 to 1980.2 
From 1980.3 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
JAPAN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
Notes: a. REER: real effective exchange rate;  b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger 
(1994); c. YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
 
 
Table 3 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
OECD REERa Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
KOREA 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1966.2 
From 1966.3 to 1966.12 
From 1967.1 to 1968.8 
From 1968.9 to 1969.10 
From 1969.11 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 1974.11 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
 From 1974.12 to 1977.11 
From 1977.12 to 1998.9 
From 1998.10 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
NETHERLANDS 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1981.7 
From 1981.8 to 1982.4 
From 1982.5 to 1983.12 
From 1984.1 to 1986.3 
From 1986.4 to 1991.6 
From 1991.7 to 1997.3 
From 1997.4 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
YES* 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
NEW ZEALAND 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.III 
From 1967.IV to 1971.II 
From 1971.III to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 1977.IV 
From 1978.I to 1981.I 
From 1981.II to 1982.III 
From 1982.IV to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
NORWAY 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.4 
From 1963.5 to 1963.7 
From 1963.8 to 1963.10 
From 1963.11 to 1974.11 
From 1974.12 to 1976.2 
From 1976.3 to 1977.7 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
 From 1977.8 to 2006.12 <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 YES FREELY FLOATING 
PORTUGAL 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1978.I 
From 1978.II to 1980.IV 
From 1981.I to 1982.II 
From 1983.III to 1993.III 
From 1983.IV to 1998.II 
From 1998.III to 1998.IV 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
YES* 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
SPAIN 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1977.6  
From 1977.7 to 1986.8 
From 1986.9 to 1987.10 
From 1987.11 to 1998.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
NO 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
SWEDEN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1981.9 
From 1981.10 to 1999.1 
From 1999.2 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
[0.05,0.10]
<0.05 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
SWIZERLAND 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.1 
From 1973.2 to 1973.5 
From 1973.6 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1972.5 
From 1972.6 to 1973.5 
From 1973.6 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FLOATING 
FREELY FLOATING 
Notes: a. REER: real effective exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger  
(1994); c. YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*:  evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence 
of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
Table 4. Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
NON-OECD 
REERa 
Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
BURKINA FASO 
1963.3-2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1963.4 
From 1963.5 to 1972.9 
From 1972.10 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 2006.10 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES* 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
COLOMBIA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.8 
From 1963.9 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
YES 
NO 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FIXED 
HAITI 
1963.3-2006.6 
From 1963.3 to 1984.3 
From 1984.4 to 1984.8 
From 1984.9 to 1991.8 
From 1991.9 to 2006.6 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
HONDURAS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.6 
From 1963.7 to 1965.8 
From 1965.9 to 1967.2 
From 1967.3 to 1984.10 
From 1984.11 to 1990.2 
From 1990.3 to 2006.7 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
FREELY FLOATING 
ISRAEL 
1963.1-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1971.2 
From 1971.3 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
YES 
NO 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
IVORY COAST 
1963.1-2006.8 
From 1963.3 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 1982.8 
From 1982.9 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
YES 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
JAMAICA 
1963.1-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1978.4 
From 1978.5 to 1981.3 
From 1981.4 to 1983.10 
From 1983.11 to 1984.7 
From 1984.8 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FREELY FALLING 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
MOROCCO 
1963.1-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1978.9 
From 1978.10 to 1981.2 
From 1981.3 to 2006.12 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
PHILLIPINES 
1963.1-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1968.10 
From 1968.11 to 1969.3 
From 1969.4 to 1969.6 
From 1969.7 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 1979.11 
From 1979.12 to 1980.9 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FALLING 
 
 
From 1980.10 to 1983.9 
From 1983.10 to 1988.8 
From 1989.9 to 1990.3 
From 1990.4 to 1990.10 
From 1990.11 to 2006.12 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
Notes: a. REER: real effective exchange rate; b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger 
(1994); c. YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence of 
instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. N/A= no available 
Table 4 (cont.). Hansen’s (1997) P-values of the Supreme, Exponential and Average Tests 
NON-OECD 
REERa 
Periods Pvsupb Pvexp Pvave Instabilityc R&R Regimesd 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.8 
From 1972.9 to 1973.1 
From 1973.2 to 1973.3 
From 1973.4 to 2006.12 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05] 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
FREELY FLOATING 
 
SRI LANKA 
1963.1-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.6 
From 1972.7 to 1972.12 
From 1973.1 to 1974.2 
From 1974.3 to 1977.12 
From 1978.1 to 1981.12 
From 1982.1 to 2006.12 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
 
 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
1963.3-2006.10 
 
From 1963.3 to 1973.9 
From 1973.10 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1988.8 
From 1988.9 to 1990.8 
From 1990.9 to 1991.4 
From 1991.5 to 1993.4 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 From 1993.5 to 1994.6 
From 1994.7 to 1996.10 
From 1996.11 to 1999.6 
From 1999.7 to 2006.10 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
VENEZUELA 
1963.1-2006.11 
 
From 1963.3 to 1970.5 
From 1970.6 to 1974.6 
From 1974.7 to 1978.6 
From 1978.7 to 1978.12 
From 1979.1 to 1985.12 
From 1986.1 to 2006.11 
 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
[0.05, 0.10] 
>0.05 
>0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
>0.05 
<0.05 
 
NO 
YES* 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
FIXED 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
QUASI-FLEXIBLE 
  Notes 
a. REER: real effective exchange rate.  
b. Pvsup, Pvexp and Pvave are the p-values of the supreme test developed by Andrews (1993)  
and the exponential and average tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). 
c. YES: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, YES*:  
evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 10% significant level, NO: no evidence 
of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
d. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid classification. 
N/A= no available 
 
Table 5 (a). Volatility by Sub-periods 
OECD RERa Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
AUSTRALIA 
1963.I- 2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1963.IV 
From 1964.I to 1973.III 
From 1973.IV 2003.IV 
yes 
no 
yes 
high: yesc 
low: yes 
high: yes 
AUSTRIA 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.1 to 1968.6 
From 1968.7 to 1971.4 
From 1971.5 to 1974.11 
From 1974.12 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
BELGIUM 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.1 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
CANADA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1979.5 
From 1979.6 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
DENMARK 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 2003.IV 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
FINLAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1963.IV 
From 1964.I to 1964.III 
From 1964.IV to 1967.III 
From 1967.IV to 1969.II 
From 1970.IV to 1974.III 
From 1974.IV to 1998.IV 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
FRANCE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
GERMANY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
GREECE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.3 
From 1974.4 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
IRELAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to1976.I 
From 1976.II to 1998.IV 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
ITALY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1975.6 
From 1975.7 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
JAPAN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.9 
From 1974.10 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
KOREA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1964.4 
From 1964.5 to 1964.12 
From 1965.1 to 1966.12 
From 1967.1 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
LUXEMBURG 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1971.IV 
From 1972.I to 1998.IV 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
NETHERLANDS 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1967.10 
From 1967.11 to 1968.6 
From 1968.7 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
NEW ZEALAND 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.II 
From 1967.III to 1972.IV 
From 1973.I to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 2003.IV 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: no 
high: no 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant 
level.; c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
Table 5 (a) (cont.). Volatility by Sub-periods 
OECD RERa Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
NORWAY 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.5 
From 1973.6 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
PORTUGAL 
1963.I-1998.IV 
 
From 1963.I to 1973.IV 
From 1974.I to 1998.IV 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
SPAIN 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1981.3 
From 1981.4 to 1998.12 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
SWEDEN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
SWITZERLAND 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.4 
From 1972.5 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
  Notes 
a. RER: real exchange rate.  
b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
 
 
 
Table 5 (b). Volatility by Sub-periods 
NON-OECD 
RERa 
Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
BURKINA FASO 
1963.3- 2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 2006.10 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
CYPRUS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1981.7 
From 1981.8 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
1963.3-2006.5 
From 1963.3 to 1976.6 
From 1976.7 to 1975.11 
From 1976.12 to 1977.10 
From 1977.11 to 1978.2 
From 1978.3 to 1978.8 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
 From 1978.9 to 1979.11 
From 1979.12 to 1981.12 
From 1982.1 to 1984.12 
From 1985.1 to 1987.8 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
high: yes 
low: no 
high: no  
low: no 
 From 1987.9 to 1993.1 
From 1993.2 to 1996.9 
From 1996.10 to 2003.9 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 From 2003.10 to 2006.5 low: yes 
EL SALVADOR 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1990.4 
From 1990.5 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
EGYPT 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.3 to 1963.9 
From 1963.10 to 1963.12 
From 1964.1 to 1964.11 
From 1964.12 to 1982.3 
From 1982.4 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 1985.5 
From 1985.6 to 2006.12 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
No 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
nono 
yes 
Noyes 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
No 
 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
high: no 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
HAITI 
1963.3-2006.6 
From 1963.3 to 1984.3 
From 1984.4 to 1991.8 
From 1991.9 to 2006.6 
low: no 
high: no 
low: no 
HONDURAS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1965.8 
From 1965.9 to 1967.2 
From 1967.3 to 1988.3 
From 1988.4 to 1989.6 
From 1989.7 to 2006.12 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
ISRAEL 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1971.3 
From 1971.4 to 2006.12 
low: yes 
high: yes 
IVORY COAST 
1963.3-2006.8 
From 1963.3 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 1983.4 
From 1983.5 to 1984.2 
From 1984.3 to 1984.11 
From 1984.12 to 1985.7 
From 1985.8 to 1987.5 
From 1987.6 to 1994.1 
From 1994.2 to 1996.7 
From 1996.8 to 2006.8 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
JAMAICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1978.4 
From 1978.5 to 1980.11 
From 1980.12 to 1983.12 
From 1984.1 to 2006.12 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
MALTA 
1963.3-2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 12006.10 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
Notes: a. RER: real exchange rate; b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant 
level; c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
 
Table 5 (b) (cont.). Volatility by Sub-periods 
NON-OECD 
RERa 
Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
 
MOROCCO 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1978.12 
From 1979.1 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
PHILIPPINES 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1969.4 
From 1969.5 to 1970.1 
From 1970.2 to 1979.8 
From 1979.9 to 1983.9 
From 1983.10 to 1990.3 
From 1990.4 to 1990.8 
From 1990.9 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.1 
From 1973.2 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
SRI LANKA 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1973.7 
From 1973.8 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
1963.3-2006.10 
 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1990.12 
From 1991.1 to 1993.4 
From 1993.5 to 1995.7 
From 1995.8 to 1999.6 
From 1999.7 to 2006.10 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
VENEZUELA 
1963.3-2006.11 
 
From 1963.3 to 1969.2 
From 1969.3 to 1973.12 
From 1974.1 to 1978.6 
From 1978.7 to 1979.9 
From 1979.10 to 1985.9 
From 1985.1 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
  Notes 
a. RER: real exchange rate.  
b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
 
 
Table 5 (c). Volatility by Sub-periods 
OECD REERa Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
AUSTRALIA 
1963.I- 2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1973.II 
From 1973.III-2003.IV 
no 
yes 
low: yesc 
high: yes 
 
BELGIUM 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1973.2 
From 1973.3 to 1998.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
CANADA 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1978.9 
From 1978.10 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
DENMARK 
1963.I-2003.IV 
 
From 1963.I to 1987.III 
From 1987.IV to 2003.IV 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
   
FINLAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.IV 
From 1968.I to 1972.IV 
From 1973.I to 1985.I 
From 1985.II to 1998.IV 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
     
FRANCE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.2 
From 1974.3 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
     
GERMANY 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.6 
From 1974.7 to 1998.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
     
GREECE 
1963.3-1998.12 
From 1963.3 to 1969.12 
From 1970.1 to 1988.5 
yes 
no 
high: no 
low: no 
 From 1988.6 to 1998.12 
 
yes 
 
high: no 
 
IRELAND 
1963.I-1998.IV 
From 1963.I to1973.IV 
From 1974.I to 1998.IV 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
ITALY 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1974.9 
From 1974.10 to 1998.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
JAPAN 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1975.1 
From 1975.2 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
KOREA 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.to 1966.12 
From 1967.1 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: no 
high: no 
 
NETHERLANDS 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1981.7 
From 1981.8 to 1982.4 
From 1982.5 to 1991.6 
From 1991.7 to 1998.12 
 
 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: no 
high: nos 
NEW ZEALAND 
1963.I-2003.IV 
From 1963.I to 1967.III 
From 1967.IV to 1971.II 
From 1971.III to 1975.II 
From 1975.III to 2003.IV 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
  Notes 
a. REER: real effective exchange rate.  
b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
Table 5 (c) (cont.). Volatility by Sub-periods 
OECD REERa Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
NORWAY 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1974.11 
From 1974.12 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
PORTUGAL 
1963.I-1998.IV 
 
From 1963.I to 1980.IV 
From 1981.I to 1998.IV 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: no 
high: no 
 
SPAIN 
1963.3-1998.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1977.6 
From 1977.7 to 1986.8 
From 1986.9 to 1998.12 
 
 
no 
Yes 
no 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
SWEDEN 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1981.9 
From 1981.10 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
 
SWITZERLAND 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1973.1 
From 1973.25 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1963.3-2006.12 
 
From 1963.3 to 1972.5 
From 1972.6 to 2006.12 
 
no 
yes 
 
low: yes 
high: yes 
  Notes 
a. REER: real effective exchange rate.  
b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
Table 5 (d). Volatility by Sub-periods 
NON-OECD 
REERa 
Periods Instabilityb Volatility 
BURKINA FASO 
1963.3- 2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1973.8 
From 1973.9 to 2006.10 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
COLOMBIA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3-1963.8 
From 1963.9-2006.12 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
No 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
 
high: yes 
low: yes 
HAITI 
1963.3-2006.6 
From 1963.3 to 1984.3 
From 1984.4 to 1991.8 
From 1991.9 to 2006.6 
low: no 
high: no 
low: no 
HONDURAS 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1963.6 
From 1963.7 to 1967.2 
From 1967.3 to 1984.10 
From 1984.11 to 1990.2 
From 1990.3 to 2006.12 
low: no 
high: no 
low: no 
high: no 
low: no 
ISRAEL 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1971. 
From 1971.3 to 2006.12 
low: yes 
high: yes 
IVORY COAST 
1963.3-2006.8 
From 1963.3 to 1982.6 
From 1982.7 to 2006.8 
low: yes 
high: yes 
JAMAICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1978.4 
From 1978.5 to 1981.3 
From 1981.4 to 1983.10 
From 1983.11 to 2006.12 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
MOROCCO 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1978.9 
From 1978.10 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
PHILIPPINES 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1969.3 
From 1969.4 to 1983.9 
From 1983.10 to 1990.3 
From 1990.4 to 1990.10 
From 1990.11 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: no 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1973.1 
From 1973.2 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
SRI LANKA 
1963.3-2006.12 
From 1963.3 to 1972.12 
From 1973.1 to 2006.12 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
1963.3-2006.10 
From 1963.3 to 1974.1 
From 1974.2 to 1990.8 
From 1990.9 to 1993.4 
From 1993.5 to 1996.10 
From 1996.11 to 1999.6 
From 1999.7 to 2006.10 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
low: yes 
high: yes 
VENEZUELA 
1963.3-2006.11 
From 1963.3 to 1970.5 
From 1970.6 to 1974.6 
From 1974.7 to 1985.12 
From 1986.1 to 2006.11 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
low: no 
high: no 
low: yes 
high: yes 
  Notes 
a. REER: real effective exchange rate.  
b. yes: evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level, no: no evidence of instability in the variance of the real exchange rate at 5% significant level. 
c. Shadow cells indicate that periods with evidence of instability present an higher volatility than more tranquil periods.  
 
 
Table 5(e): Exchange-Regime Duration Effects on Volatility 
 RER REER 
ˆ  z-statistic ˆ  z-statistic 
OECD 
Australia 8.00E-07 0.0000 1.31E-07 0.0000 
Austria -5.56E-08 0.1407 - - 
Belgium 2.36E-08 0.0000 9.32E-10 0.0239 
Canada 8.61E-08 0.0037 3.10E-08 0.0014 
Denmark 8.94E-07 0.1430 -2.29E-08 0.4304 
Finland 4.49E-08 0.4173 2.79E-08 0.0000 
France -1.64E-08 0.2591 -8.39E-09 0.1242 
Germany 9.37E-11 0.8805 1.00E-08 0.4729 
Greece 7.62E-09 0.2217 -4.64E-09 0.2405 
Ireland 1.40E-06 0.0000 1.56E-08 0.0364 
Italy -1.39E-08 0.1519 8.04E-10 0.7353 
Japan -0.01728 0.9958 -1.22E-09 0.4405 
Korea 2.47E-07 0.3346 -7.55E-09 0.7634 
Luxemburg 4.77E-08 0.0000 - - 
Netherlands -1.93E-07 0.0000 -7.19E-09 0.0028 
Norway 3.45E-08 0.0000 2.08E-09 0.0010 
New Zealand 1.95E-06 0.0000 3.95E-08 0.0000 
Portugal 1.27E-06 0.0000 1.49E-08 0.0000 
Spain 4.77E-06 0.0013 1.94E-08 0.1457 
Sweden 1.39E-07 0.0413 -6.15E-09 0.1681 
Switzerland 5.02E-08 0.0000 5.42E-10 0.0001 
United Kingdom 5.52E-08 0.0017 2.06E-09 0.0000 
NON-OECD 
Burkina Faso -2.20E-07 0.0000 -5.54E-09 0.0000 
Chile -7.91E-05 0.0000 - - 
Colombia -9.76E-06 0.0158 -5.77E-07 0.0018 
Cyprus -1.09E-06 0.0001 - - 
Dominican Republic 2.18E-06 0.0000 - - 
El Salvador -2.19E-08 0.2157 - - 
Egypt 5.45E-06 0.0031 - - 
Haiti -1.84E-06 0.0001 -1.06E-07 0.0001 
Honduras -1.28E-06 0.000 -2.21E-07 0.0000 
India -1.76E-07 0.0000 - - 
Israel -8.74E-06 0.0000 -3.57E-07 0.0000 
Jamaica 2.13E-07 0.0000 1.46E-08 0.0000 
Malta 1.97E-08 0.1274 - - 
Morocco -0.577607 0.2661 1.94E-10 0.4455 
Philippines -4.20E-06 0.0000 -6.92E-08 0.0000 
South Africa -1.56E-06 0.0000 -6.77E-09 0.0013 
Sri Lanka -1.11E-06 0.0000 -1.92E-06 0.0000 
Venezuela -3.53E-06 0.0000 -6.18E-07 0.0025 
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Figure 1 (a). Monthly/Quarterly rate of change in OECD countries real exchange rates against  
  the United States Dollar, 1960-2006.  
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Figure 1 (b). Monthly rate of change in non-OECD countries real exchange rates against  
  the United States Dollar, 1960-2006. 
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Figure 2 (a). Monthly/Quarterly rate of change in OECD countries real effective exchange rates 1960-2006.  
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Figure 2 (b). Monthly rate of change in non-OECD countries real effective exchange rates 1960-2006.  
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Figure 3 (a). OECD real exchange rates p-values of the supreme (pvsup) test developed by Andrews (1993) and the exponential 
(pvexp) and average (pvave) tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994), 1963-2006. 
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Figure 3 (b). Non-OECD real exchange rates p-values of the supreme (pvsup) test developed by Andrews (1993) 
and the exponential (pvexp) and average (pvave) tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994), 1963-2006. 
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Figure 4 (a). OECD real effective exchange rates p-values of the supreme (pvsup) test developed by Andrews (1993) and the 
exponential (pvexp) and average (pvave) tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994), 1963-2006. 
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Figure 4 (b). Non-OECD real effective exchange rates p-values of the supreme (pvsup) test developed by Andrews (1993) 
and the exponential (pvexp) and average (pvave) tests developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994), 1963-2006. 
 
